IV

A Mundurucu makes me a present of the mummified head of a Parintintin girl, and tells me how and why he killed her.

[93] One of these barbarians, who was twenty-five or thirty years old, outgoing and bold, and a voluble talker, made me a present on the following day of the mummified head of a Parintintin girl. This head, which is now to be found in the National Museum [Rio de Janeiro], retains its abundant hair, which is partly shaved in front as though with a razor. The forehead thus appears to be prolonged nearly to the middle of the skull; in the center of this artificial forehead stands a circular cluster of black hair. This head, which was ornamented with [94] brilliantly colored feathers, must have belonged to a girl fashionable in her own tribe.

[95] Here I must point out that the Mundurucu often make war on enemy heathens for the purpose of capturing women and children rather than killing them. They do kill the men, whose heads they preserve as trophies. When preparing for these forays, they frankly say: "I am going because I need a woman to marry, or a little one to be my wife's child."

A Mundurucu warrior would therefore be greatly concerned to capture rather than to kill a girl like the one whose head was offered me.

Indeed, the barbarian told me that he had killed her by mistake, falling in the heat of battle to discern her sex. She was running out of the hut which he and his companions had taken at dawn by surprise, and he had thrown himself upon her, piercing her through the back with his powerful spear. He felt sorry when he found that she was a woman, and a young one at that. But nevertheless he cut off her head, removing the brain, and smoked it over a green wood fire until it became mummified.

[96] It was strange to witness the extreme tenderness the barbarian bestowed on this enemy head. A deadly hatred has ruled for many years between the Mundurucu and Parintintin tribes, and wars of extermination take place between them.

[see p. 71 col. th. - Revised]

[3] the plains] are not located in the district which Ayres de Casal named Mundurucania. They stand in the territory which the geographer called Tapajonia, between the Tapajos and the Xingu and close to the sources of the eastern tributaries of the Tapajos, namely the Cadeveri, Cabetutum and Cururu rivers, the Rio das Tropas (which the Mundurucu call Pimuri) and the Rio do Creputi.

In the course of my journey I encountered a great many small streams that were sources of the Cadeveri and tributaries of the Tapajos.

Had I proceeded in the same direction beyond Necodemus a few days longer, I would undoubtedly have come upon the sources of the tributaries of the Xingu.

IX

Wars of the Mundurucu -- waging procedure -- End of these wars.

We have already noted that the wars of these barbarians are waged with the sole aim of capturing young women and children of both sexes. Within the tribe, however, the captives are treated no differently than native Mundurucu. They are painted with the same arabesques of indelible dyes; the woman immediately gets a husband, and the child finds an adoptive father who is almost invariably the same Indian who captured him. When preparations are made for one of these forays, the warrior's sister, his mother, or some other relative places an order for a child, saying: "Bring me a boy to be my son."

The Mundurucu's chief victims are the Parintintin; in addition to a desire for captives, the deadly hatred [94] which has long raged between the two tribes is another motive for frequent [illegible].

Whenever it becomes known that a band of Parintintin have appeared somewhere, the Mundurucu immediately set off after them. To my knowledge, however, this inveterate hatred is not directed toward other tribes. Among the Mundurucu there runs a

721 tale, probably inaccurate, that whenever one of them is captured by the Parintintin he is devoured alive by the mouthful, "as if they were jaguars and we were deer."

Inaccurate or not, this tale serves to fire even more the Mundurucu desire for vengeance.

726 Those wars to which we have referred are usually mere forays.

When summer comes, a number of Mundurucu get together, make ready their bows, arrows, horns and provisions, and then set off.

Whenever possible, each warrior is accompanied by his wife or by a sister. The role of this sutler, who sometimes is no older than fifteen or sixteen, consists of slinging the warrior's hammock on a tree, preparing his chestnuts, carrying the load, and helping to prepare the enemy head and to bring in the captives; in short, she does whatever is needed to leave him entirely free for the attack.

They go hunting leisurely along the way, and these raids last for weeks and even months. At night they all gather and camp together.

If they find some trail in the depths of the woods, or some other sign pointing to the passage of a human being, they study it with rare prudence and subtlety. If they spy a hut or a village, they make a reconnaissance [96] in the greatest possible silence; and they walk so adroitly that not even the dry leaf they crush underfoot can be heard. It is as though they walked on a thick rug. They surround the hut and silently wait for dawn. Then they set it ablaze with a long staff, its end covered with flaming pitch, and post themselves in ambush near the door.

Suddenly awakened, the besieged occupants immediately let out the terrible cry, "Mundurucu!"

Those confused men who attempt to break through the ring of besiegers are immediately pierced with enormous spears.

The children, aware that they are at the mercy of the enemy, give themselves up.

The women nearly always offer resistance, put up a fight, and are made prisoners only by sheer force.

727 And then the Mundurucu retreat on the double. The enemy heads are cut off and hastily prepared. They travel day and night

726 A campaign might start at the beginning of the dry season in one year and end at the end of the next dry season, a total of a year and a half in the field. During its course, several villages of different tribes might be attacked. The warriors sustained themselves principally by hunting, and the collection of wild foods.

721 The purpose of aboriginal Mundurucú warfare was to secure trophy heads and to bring back captive children to adopt into the tribe. Wars were usually initiated by young men eager to gain war prowess and prestige by taking heads and captives. These young men would resolve among themselves to go to war and would then approach the chief to ask him to lead them. If the chief and the older men approved of the project, the chief took over the organization of the party. [203] Invitations were sent to other villages via a messenger who [729] belonged to the Muchacha'anren, a society of older, valiant [575] warriors having an intimate knowledge of certain songs. On [534] his route, the muchacha carried a special trumpet known as the pem, on which he gave a distinctive signal when just outside one of the villages to be invited. A muchacha of that village gave an answering signal and then went out to meet him. Upon their encounter they played a song of the society on their trumpets and danced slowly back and forth towards each other. They then proceeded to the men's house where the messenger, in front of the assembled warriors, addressed an invitation to join in the war. The two most distinguished chiefs of the participating villages assumed

721 the leadership of the party, but the other chiefs were influential, also.

726 The warriors who accepted the invitation then busied themselves in making an enormous number of arrows, bows, and fresh bow strings. The warrior usually was accompanied by his wife or a female relative who carried hammocks and utensils, and with the other accompanying women, prepared food. The warrior carried only his arms and confined himself to hunting and scouting. The party moved slowly as it was necessary to procure subsistence and to scout the territory ahead. When the enemy village was neared, a temporary shelter was made in the forest and the women left there. The men then proceeded under cover of darkness to surround the village. At the first signs of dawn the warriors were already assembled in the forest on the village perimeter and the chief gave the signal to attack. The signal was sounded by two <u>muhacha</u> on their special war trumpets. Arrows, the points of which had been coated with resin, were ignited and launched into the roofs of the houses, and the warriors charged into the village making as much noise as possible to confuse and terrify the inhabitants. As the latter ran from their houses and attempted to escape they were seized by the Mundurucú. 727 Men and women were slain and decapitated while the children were taken captive. Loot was confined to a small amount of arms and ornaments that had more trophy value than anything else. Surprise was the major element in the attack and the Mundurucú always retired before the enemy had the opportunity to regroup and inflict losses on them. They retreated rapidly

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even short expeditions could well take a party over 100 miles from home; and 100 miles through dense, trackless forest and across major streams is no mean trip.

It is obvious that Munduruú warfare consisted of much more than sporadic and short forays. The average party campaigned only during the dry season, setting out when the rivers fell in May and returning before they again rose in November. Longer expeditions set out at the end of the rains and remained in the field throughout the rainy season and the following dry period, returning before the next rains.

As among the Indians of the North American Plains, youths sought openly for the excitement of war and looked upon it as a means of self-validation and aggrandizement of prestige. But unlike the Plains Indians, the Munduruú did not openly assert this prestige once it was won; if anything, the person who achieved status became even more self-effacing and less prone to open competitiveness. The young men, however, did not embark upon raids by themselves. They expressed their desire to the chief of the village in words indicative of the martial disposition of the society: "My grandfather, take us to hunt the parwat. We wish to die in the forest, not in the village." The chief consulted with the older men in order to decide whether the occasion was auspicious. If there was general approval, he proceeded to organize a war party that would include the eager young but would be under the competent direction of experienced elders, for age in Munduruú society was an important criterion of status.

Although the initiative for a war originated in one village, men from several villages participated. The determination of a village to form a war party was quickly communicated to other communities, but a formal invitation had to be extended. This was carried by a man of the *Marbachs* society, a group of older warriors who were especially well versed in Munduruú lore and songs and who had taken enemy heads. As the messenger neared each village he sounded three short blasts on a horn used only by members of the society, and was answered by a like signal from a Marbachs of the village being invited. After entering the village, he delivered the invitation and proceeded on his itinerary, collecting volunteers from a number of communities.

Intervillage cooperation enabled the Munduruú to place large war parties in the field without stripping any one village of all its manpower. Those who took part generally desired to clear land for gardens first, but even when this was not possible or when the expedition lasted more than a year, the horticultural cycle could be maintained by those remaining behind. The problem of leadership of a group drawn from several communities was resolved by delegating authority to two village chiefs who were also members of the Marbachs society. Actually, the two formal leaders did not have absolute control, and all important decisions were made by the older men of the expedition acting as a body.

The war party was accompanied by the wives of the warriors and a number of unmarried girls. Their tasks were to carry cooking utensils and all of

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took his trophy a short distance into the forest, where its magical effect was exercised. But the supernatural power of the head could only be maintained when certain precautions were observed. Both the taker of the head and his wife were prohibited from sexual intercourse and were supposed to avoid looking upon any person who had recently indulged in the act. Accordingly, they lived very restrained and sequestered lives; the Dajeboiki spent most of his time lying in his hammock, and his wife was assigned special assistants to perform her household and garden chores.

The Dajeboiki was also responsible for sponsoring a series of ceremonies that took place during three successive rainy seasons following the return of the expedition. During the first, which took place shortly after the return of the war party, feather pendants were attached to the ears of the trophy head; certain clans had the prerogative of affixing the feathers of particular species of birds. Also, the eye sockets were sealed with beeswax and two paca teeth were placed across each eye. During the second phase of the ceremony, the ornaments and skin were stripped from the skull and it was retired to a corner of the men's house. The third part of the ceremony was devoted to stringing the enemy's teeth on a woven cotton belt. This ornament served as a permanent trophy of the slain enemy, and the skull was left to deteriorate in the men's house.

The final phase of the ceremony involved the greatest degree of intervillage participation, for it served as a ceremonial reunion of the *Dawkik* or "mothers of the arrow." The Dawkik was a society devoted to the celebration of Munduruki arms and included all adult males. At this time, a great feast was held, martial songs were sung, and the young boys were given instruction in the songs of the Dawkik. At the conclusion of the celebration, the ceremonial cycle terminated and the Dajeboiki and his wife resumed their normal life.[9]

No special honor was accorded the warrior who captured children. They were turned over to his wife to rear as her own. Having been incorporated into the kinship system through adoption, the children were accorded the treatment appropriate to their relationship status. In time, they married members of the opposite moiety and lived through a normal Munduruki life cycle. Contemporary informants affirm that captives were in no way treated as inferiors, although their origins were certainly remembered. Young men were said to have taken part in Munduruki war parties, even in attacks against their native group. No cases of defection were reported.

GOALS OF WARFARE

George Fothauer (1954:138) maintains in a recent article that the Mohave "conception of war was largely non-instrumental—it was an end in itself." The Munduruki looked upon warfare in much the same way; war was considered an essential and unquestioned part of their way of life, and foreign tribes were attacked because they were enemies by definition. This basic orientation emerged clearly from interviews with informants. Unless direct, specific questions were asked, the Munduruki never assigned specific causes to particular

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wars. The necessity of ever having to defend their home territory was denied, and provocation by other groups was not remembered as a cause of war in Munduruci tradition. It might be said that enemy tribes caused the Munduruci to go to war simply by existing, and the word for enemy meant merely any group that was not Munduruci.

Despite this seemingly undirected aggressiveness, it was possible to establish through direct questioning and by analysis of field data that certain individual and social goals were realized through warfare. The more important of these goals will be analyzed and their significance as causes of the institution of warfare will be evaluated in the following section.

The Munduruci were partially motivated to war by the quest for manufactured goods, which, as noted earlier, were obtained from the Brazilians in return for services as mercenary warriors against unpacified tribes. The symbiotic relationship that became established was noted by Chandless (1862:276) who wrote that the Munduruci were "honest and faithful," and "very friendly toward white people, warring only against unpacified Indians while protecting those friendly with the whites."

The scope and importance of Munduruci mercenary activities is impressive. In the early 19th century, the whites urged them to attack the troublesome Mura Indians of the lower Madeira River, and so great was their success that the Mura were scattered as far as the vicinity of Ega, hundreds of miles up the Amazon River (Bates 1863:168-9). Ayres de Casal (1817:237-8) reported that many of the victims of the Munduruci, among them the Mura, were forced to seek the protection of the white settlements. The traders who employed the Munduruci thus obtained a dual advantage; the hostiles were not only quelled but were driven into the arms of the labor-hungry whites.

Later references also attest to the alliance with the Brazilians. The Munduruci were enlisted by colonial officials during the Revolution of the Cabanos in 1835–36, and one of their leaders in the war was given an honorary commission in the army in recognition of his services (Barre 1963:132). Bates (1863:162) reports that in about 1853 the Munduruci were instrumental in helping the Brazilians of the Madeira River to suppress the Arara Indians, and Tocantins (1877:148) states that shortly before his journey to the Munduruci, the latter struck at a marauding group of Parintintin Indians at the behest of the Brazilians. Coudreau (1897:39–41) relates another case of mercenary service by the Munduruci, whom he characterizes as a people "known for selling their military valor to whoever wants to pay for it." On this occasion, three traders of the Madeira River had been killed by hostile Indians, and their colleagues went to the Munduruci of the upper Tapajós River and offered merchandise in return for a retaliatory expedition. The offer was accepted but the savage was a failure, for most of the 80 men and 40 women who took part in the raid died of illness before contacting the enemy.

Although mercenary service is one of the more interesting aspects of Munduruci warfare during the 19th century, contemporary informants hardly thought it worthy of mention. They acknowledged their alliance with

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the whites with some pride, but viewed their efforts as civilizing missions against the "savage Indians," or "Indians of the forest." Their attitude was clearly that they did what had to be done and had always been done; the remuneration was secondary.

It is impossible to determine what proportion of Munduruci warfare in the last century was instigated by the whites, but it is clear that many, and probably most, raids were conducted against groups having no enmity or even contact with Brazilian society. It is evident that the Munduruci did not remain warlike solely for reasons of material gain, but mercenary service did serve to encourage the perpetuation of a deeply rooted pattern. Whether or not economic and ecological conditions stimulated warfare in the preceding century is difficult to ascertain. It is known that the area of Munduruci occupation expanded northward in the late 19th and early 19th centuries into regions formerly inhabited by other groups. While the Munduruci moved into a vacuum that they had helped to create, it is almost certain that assimilation and depopulation due to disease had decimated the ranks of the previous occupants far more than had Munduruci arms, and the population of the latter was already on the wane. Additional territory was hardly the goal of the migrant Munduruci; the lure of manufactured articles available through trade with the white settlements offers a more adequate explanation of their northward drift to the lower Madeira and Tapajós Rivers.

The secondary nature of economic goals in Munduruci warfare is even more manifest when looting is considered. No objects of significant economic value were taken, and the raiders maintained their mobility by traveling light. Captive children were a far more important class of booty than were material items. Captive-taking was a means of strengthening the group through the addition of new members, but it is not certain whether the increment compensated for the loss of mature warriors and their female followers. If, however, one accepts intense warfare as a given factor, the capture of children was important to its successful continuance. Moreover, the Munduruci valued and desired children, and the captives were treated as the captor's own.

The Munduruci warrior was strongly motivated by the desire to achieve prestige through the demonstration of valor, especially as signified by the taking of a trophy head. The Dajeboiik was subjected to very onerous restrictions, but he was rewarded by the lifetime respect of his fellowmen. However, if he was to maintain his position and advance to the high status of a Muchacho, it was expected that he would also become a font of traditional lore and songs. Prestige was not openly asserted among the Munduruci, and the tone of the society was strongly egalitarian. Decision-making was decentralized and internal and joint activity depended upon the consensus of the participants, but the successful headhunter exerted considerable influence in the attainment of such consensus—albeit through subdued means.

Despite the fact that individual wars were undertaken because of the desire of the participants to gain prestige, it would be most dubious to admit this as a fundamental cause of warfare. It seems almost a truism to say that

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the individual to demonstrate proficiency in the attainment of a socially desirable goal will himself be valued and that this will motivate him to appropriate acts, but this still does not answer the question of why the goal and the accompanying activity is valued. Newcomb (1950:329) has stated the same case with cogency in regard to Plains warfare.

The trophy head was prized as a symbol of Munduruci prowess and of its owner's status but it was also sought because it was the center of a number of magico-religious observances. The trophy was thought to be pleasing to the spirit posters of the game animals because it had inherent power, contingent upon the proper observance of connected ritual acts. The possession of a trophy head thus resulted in greater economic abundance, and in this sense served the same general purpose as does the Jivaro tsantsa. However, this aspect of the trophy quest does not cast much light upon Munduruci headhunting, for alternate ways of pleasing the spirits were known and practiced. The ceremonial and shamanistic techniques of propitiating the spirit protects of game animals were complex both in practice and in ideational contents; contrast, the linkage of the trophy head and the spirits was vague and ephemeral; it is probable that headhunting developed subsequent to the rites connected with the animal spirits and had become only loosely integrated with them. It is to be expected that any important social activity will become vue and belief gathered in this manner, but it would be erroneous to proceed to explain the activity by its supporting ideology.

Finally, it could be considered that the Munduruci looked upon fighting as a source of art and excitement. The enemy was looked upon as game to be hunted, and the Munduruci still speak of the pursuit in the same terms that they reserve for peccary and tapir. War was a relief from boredom, but it is not surprising that peace would be boring to people who consider themselves warriors. One might ask why they did not relieve boredom in leg racing as do some groups, or in drinking bouts as did many of their neighbors. In short, can we not look upon activity and play drives as being inherent within the species and proceed from that vantage to explain the particular way they are manifested in particular cultures?

FUNCTIONS OF MUNDURUCU WARFARE

The manifest goals of warfare provide us with an understanding of the incentives that motivated the Munduruci warrior. The religious and sportive aspects of warfare were found to be considerably more ephemeral than were the economic and prestige goals involved, but even the latter two depended upon the existence of a social organization that allowed and encouraged intensive military activity by its very nature. Moreover, the most important single motivation to hostility was a generalized aggressiveness that recognized no specific aim and this factor yields the most important single clue to an understanding Munduruci warfare. If specific goals do not fully explain the extent and intensity of the pursuits, and if the pressure of external circumstances did not motivate battle, then the main dynamics of warfare must be sought

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within the structure of the society. We must explain the function of warfare, or the social conditions that caused the Munduruci to direct enormous hostility against an amorphously inimical outside world.

As a first step toward answering this question, we turn briefly to a re-examination of Munduruci military organization. Leaving out of consideration for the moment the bellicosity of the Munduruci, the single factor that contributed most to the success of their arms was the tribal organization of war parties. The recruitment of men from a number of communities aggrandized their expeditions while leaving unimpaired the economic and defensive functions of the villages. Tribalism was also central to the ceremonies that were held at the conclusion of a war. On these occasions the tribal warrior society, or Dawkö, gathered to celebrate the prowess of Munduruci arms, and the widely scattered members of certain clans assembled to exercise their prerogative of attaching particular decorations to the trophy heads.

Intercommunity cooperation in warfare was facilitated by the peculiar juxtaposition of matrilocal residence and patrilineal descent. The male Munduruci population was thereby linked by cross-cutting ties of residential affinity and affiliation by descent. For example, any Munduruci man was a member of his own village, in most cases a native of another village, and in several instances a former resident of the village of a divorced wife; he was also linked by ties of patrilineal descent to all the villages in which members of his clan resided. On the other hand, he was not involved in any cohesive and localized lineage unit. The kinship structure imposed no boundaries upon the local group; the male social world was the tribe.

The manner in which bonds were extended throughout the tribe necessitated certain social adjustments. The residence rule destroyed the residential basis of patrilineality and thereby weakened clanship. Correspondingly, the only enduring group of coresidents, consanguineal kinsmen was the extended family of women related in the female line. Such aggregates of females posed a threat to the superordinate position of the men which was resolved through several means, one of the most important of which was residence in the men's house. This unit freed the male from the necessity of becoming integrated into the economy and authority structure of his wife's household in villages in which he had no supporting group of kinsmen. Although he owed respect and some service to his father-in-law, the locus of his social and economic life was the men's house. This provided the framework within which a group of men from diverse villages was welded into a highly unitary working and fighting unit. Their position as a militant and self-conscious social entity, demarcated from and superior to the women, was reinforced by the cult of the sacred musical instruments. Thus male solidarity was promoted on a tribal level through the dispersal of patrilineal kinsmen, and on the village level through the men's house.

The organization of 19th-century Munduruci society made male solidarity on the village and tribal level not only possible but a functional necessity. Conflict had to be rigorously suppressed, for if men became aroused in overt

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violence along lines of residential affinity, it would pit patrilineal kin against each other and destroy the very fabric of the kinship structure. And if the combatants aligned themselves according to kinship affiliations, strife could break out within villages and even within households. The Munduruci situation is opposite that found in some segmentary societies, in which, following Fortes' (1945:240–4) analysis, strife between kinship-territorial units of similar scope is actually productive of social equilibrium.

The necessity for suppressing overt conflict as the only alternative to serious disruptions of social relations was complemented by the necessity for male cohesion and unity in villages whose hereditary inhabitants were the women. As a result, Munduruci ethical values enjoined absolute harmony and cooperation upon all the males of the tribe. No such feeling was expected in interfemale relations. The female ingroup was limited to the membership of one or two extended families; beyond these limits, open jealousy and fighting could and did occur. This dichotomy in ethical values is understandable when one considers how different were the male and female social contexts.

Interpersonal and intergroup grievances will arise in all human societies as a necessary concomitant of social life, and the Munduruci are no exception to this rule. Despite the surface tranquility of interpersonal relations among the males, numerous causes of latent antagonism existed. One potentially disruptive factor of especial significance to the problem at hand was that patrilineal succession to the chieftaincy was assured by exempting the chief's sons from the matrilineal rule. The extended family of the chief thus became the largest and most cohesive such unit in the village, for it retained sons while gathering sons-in-law. The presence of his own patrilineal kinsmen reinforced the chief's position, but it also resulted in antagonism and resentment on the part of the other men of the village, over whom he exerted no lineage-based authority. Evidence to support this statement can be found in contemporary Munduruci society in a number of cases of sorcery accusation and punishment. In one village the chief and his son were both slain as suspected witches. In another, the family of the chief wished to execute an accused sorcerer against the will of the other residents, and in a third village the family of the chief protected one of their number against the intention of the other villagers to execute him. No evidence of such tensions would have been manifest to the casual observer in any of the three villages, the disaffected parties usually maintain cordial and cooperative relations with their antagonists both before and after the climax of the train of events, but they generally move from the village as soon as convenient. These conflicts, then, are instrumental in furthering the fragmentation of villages under the current condition of pacification.

Given the potentially centrifugal nature of leadership, descent, and residence, warfare functioned to preserve, or at least prolong, the cohesiveness of Munduruci society. The chief was able to maintain his leadership over his family eclectic group of followers through his position as war leader and his complementary role as mediator between them and Brazilian society. To the

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Munduruci these are the essential functions of chieftainship, and contemporary informants commonly ascribe the decline of nucleated-village life to the disappearance of such attributes of leadership.

Of even greater importance to the integration of Munduruci society, warfare activated and intensified male unity and values, both of which functioned to make matrilocality viable. Finally, the only permissible intrasocietal mechanism for the release of aggression was sorcery and the killing of sorcerers, and the previously cited cases indicate that they created as many tensions as they resolved. Actually, the only way in which hostility could be unleashed without damage to the society was against the outside world. Paradoxically for a people who considered all the world an an enemy, the true cause of enmity came from within their own society.

Much of the preceding argument has hinged upon the matrilocal and patrilineal character of Munduruci society. In a recent article I showed that Munduruci social structure in the 19th century could only be understood as a result of post-contact change and that the aboriginal society was organized on patrilocal and patrilineal lines (Murphy 1956). The fact that the Munduruci were vigorous warriors before their shift to matrilocality suggests that warfare acquired new functions subsequent to that change and consequent upon it. These new functions, as they have been outlined in this paper, provide us with an understanding of how Munduruci society remained cohesive and maintained its boundaries through more than a century of contact with the whites.

We will now broaden our analysis of the function of warfare within Munduruci society to the closely related problem of its function within the structure of Munduruci-Brazilian relationships. The two bases of this symbiosis were trade and war. Matrilocality evolved as a result of trade relations with the whites, but it was workable in a patrilineal society only when intrasocietal hostilities were repressed and latent antagonisms channeled into intense warfare. Warfare and the connected ceremonies also helped to perpetuate the system of clanship in this newly-evolved type of society, for they constituted almost the only occasions upon which corporate functions of the fragmented descent groups were exercised. Conversely, matrilocality and patrilineality provided the structure for warfare on a tribal scale and thus enabled the Munduruci successfully to pursue hostilities against comparatively undisrupted tribes during a period when their own numbers were being reduced through disease and emigration to Brazilian settlements. And by frequently undertaking raids in the service of the whites, the Munduruci had solidified their peaceful relationship with the technologically and numerically superior society. The Brazilians were willing to respect the autonomy of the Munduruci so long as it was useful to them. We may conclude that the system of of matrilocality and patrilineality and the institution of warfare were mutually reinforcing and served to maintain Munduruci society during a period that witnessed the disappearance or dissolution of many of their neighbors.

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CONCLUSION

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Our analysis of the functions of Mundurucú warfare has concluded that the institution operated to preserve the integration and solidarity of Mundurucú society. These findings accord closely with Simmel's theory of conflict and are also substantiated by Fernandes' (1952:354) conclusion on the functions of Tupinambá warfare. The means by which this social end was accomplished can be viewed as a variable of the Mundurucú type of society. The latter was of a unique order; it was structured so as to ramify kinship bonds throughout the tribe, but it was extremely vulnerable to any open display of aggression within the group. This, and the ambivalent position of the men, resulted in the suppression of hostility and the emphasis upon solidarity that characterized male social relations. Such solidarity could be maintained only through the release of latent aggression in a socially valued manner upon surrogate objects. Mundurucú warfare thus corresponds to Coser's (1953:48) formulation of the "safety valve" mechanism in society:

> Social systems provide for specific institutions which serve to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments. These safety valve institutions help to maintain the system by preventing otherwise probable conflict or by reducing its disruptive effects. They provide substitute objects upon which to displace hostile sentiments, as well as means of abreaction. Through these safety valves, hostility is prevented from turning against its original object.

The achievement of specific ends or the defeat of a particular enemy were secondary considerations in Mundurucú warfare. They fought any group and they fought for the sake of fighting. The ultimate source of their bellicosity was the repressed hostility generated within the society, and the ultimate source of repression was the potential destructiveness of intrasocietal aggression.

Safety valve institutions of one kind or another are probably universal in culture. Coser (*ibid.*:41) distinguishes two means by which aggressiveness may safely be released by the members of a society. These are:

> . . . *Ventilation*, which provide a socially sanctioned framework for carrying out conflict without leading to consequences that disrupt relations within a group, and those safety-valve institutions which serve to divert hostility onto substitute objects or which function as channels for cathartic release.

Mundurucú warfare and society fall into the class of "safety-valve institutions", the structure of the society in such that Ventilation would be impossible insofar as the Mundurucú cannot publicly acknowledge the existence of intrasocietal hostilities. The institutionalized public arguments and wrestling matches of the Trumai Indians (Murphy and Quain 1955:37–39) and the spear throwing bouts between Upper Xingú tribes (Galvão 1950:166) are illustrations of cases in which hostility is allowed to appear in a controlled and sanctioned context and is thereby dissipated. Sides are drawn and the issue is resolved among the Upper Xingú groups; the Mundurucú cannot even afford to take sides openly.

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Coser (1956:156-7) has considered the relationship between conflict and the rigidity of the social structure, which he defines as "the degree to which it disallows direct expression of antagonistic claims," and concludes:

> Our hypothesis, that the need for safety-valve institutions increases with the rigidity of the social system, may be extended to suggest that unrealistic [i.e. cathartic and not oriented toward the frustrating object] conflict may be expected to occur as a consequence of rigidity present in the social structure.

Munduruci warfare was clearly "unrealistic" and the social structure was rigid in Coser's sense. It is possible to broaden our example to include a larger category of rigid social structures and to consider their functional concomitants. I would propose as a statistically testable hypothesis that matrilocal societies must repress open aggression in order to insure cohesion and continuity. If we take any matrilocal and matrilineal or bilateral society as our model, the system of residence tends to disperse males at least throughout the local community. Thus, any male will have close ties of kinship and economic interdependence with his housemates, his natal household, the households of his maternal uncles, and the households of his brothers. The same is true of patrilocal societies from the viewpoint of the women, but males are the principal political role-players in all human societies. Any conflict involving men therefore becomes a matter of deep community concern. As among the Munduruci, if the lines of allegiance in a conflict situation are drawn according to kinship in any matrilocal society, bonds of local contiguity will be shattered, if primary loyalty is given to bonds of residence, the ties of kinship will be broken. In short, when the residence and kin groups of the male do not coincide, he acquires multiple commitments that may come into conflict. Also, the individual male will more readily repress his grievances if he cannot rely upon the full support of a solidary group.

Brief reference to the ethnographic literature suggests that the social solidarity of matrilocal groups is not restricted to my model. Writing of the Apinayé, Nimuendajú (1939:129) says:

> I have never heard of a case of rape nor witnessed anything of publicly scandalous adultery, larceny, or slander. Only when intoxicated do these natives inflict damage on property and bodily maltreatment on persons or commit manslaughter. Compared with any Šerente settlement the village of Bacaba, at least, is a model of internal peace and harmony, and this would hold for Cato Preto, too, in the absence of alcohol.

The Šerente and the Apinayé are Gê-speaking groups of eastern Brazil and are culturally quite similar. The principal difference between them is that the fractious Šerente are patrilineal and patrilocal, while the harmonious Apinayé are matrilineal and matrilocal. Turning to North America, we have the classical example of the matrilocal and "Apollonian" Pueblonans. Ellis (1951:190) has noted of Pueblo warfare:

> Beyond protection, warfare served to provide legitimate outlet for the frustrations and aggressions arising from ungovernized competition or suspicions thereof among peoples of the same general culture.

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The repression of open conflict among the Pueblonans accounts for the latent hostility that many ethnologists have seen seething below surface relations. Under modern conditions this often results in community fission, and the same process can be noted among the contemporary, unwarring Mundurucú. Lacking adequate safety-valves for the release of aggression, the Mundurucú now tend to withdraw from the frustrating situation.

Not all matrilocal groups repress aggression to the same extent as do the Mundurucú, nor are they as warlike. The greater emphasis of the Mundurucú upon social cohesion and external aggression stems from the persistence of patrilineal clans in a matrilocal society. This factor, combined with inter-village matrilocality, made hostility even more explosive and internal release systems less workable. It oriented the group toward warfare and provided the organization for its effective pursuit. Some deviation from our model is expectable, for there is no fixed and unvarying reservoir of aggression in society; it has its roots in the social structure, as does its expression. Our thesis states only that matrilocal societies must repress the open expression of intrasocietal conflict and that this repressed hostility, variable in intensity, will be released through acceptable and nondisruptive means within the society, or through warfare, or through both. But warfare, it can be concluded, is an especially effective means of promoting social cohesion in that it provides an occasion upon which the members of the society unite and submerge their factional differences in the vigorous pursuit of a common purpose.

NOTES

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[1] This seemingly incredible savage was still encountered by the Urubú Indians of the upper Gurupí River in the state of Maranhão, according to a personal communication from the Brazilian ethnologist, Dr. Darcy Ribeiro.

[2] A fuller description of the ceremonies held subsequent to a successful raid will be published in a forthcoming monograph (Murphy n.d.).

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A: Murphy & Steward E-5 (1952-1953) 1956
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Despite the flourishing trade in gewgaws, the allure of most trade goods lay more in their sheer utility than in their exotic qualities. The increased efficiency of the Mundurucu economy made possible by steel tools must have been enormous.

The parallels in these basic processes of acculturation between the Mundurucú and the Bontapaian are probably to be found also among most aborigines. In the case of the Mundurucú, the displacement of aboriginal crafts by commercial goods better suited to meet local needs, both old and new, inexorably led to increased dependency of the people upon those who furnished these goods and therefore to a greater involvement in economic patterns external to their own culture.

The Mundurucú fashion, like those of the Algonkians, became impresarios of the trading posts. More than a century ago, Bates related that Brazilian traders made seasonal expeditions to trade with the Mundurucú. After rubber became important in the Amazon, permanent trading posts were established on the upper Tapajós River. These posts, whether owned by individuals or companies, exercised such control over tracts of rubber-producing forest that they compelled the rubber collector to trade exclusively with them. They accomplished this by their power of compensation and by holding the collector in debt. The traders among the Mundurucú were never able to obtain title of ownership to the rubber regions within Mundurucú territory proper,[2] but they made the Indians dependent upon them in a very real sense through their credit arrangements. In time, all of the Mundurucú villages came under the control of various traders, who were so influential by virtue of being necessary to the Indians that they were able to appoint the "chief", in violation of Indian tradition, and thereby intensified their control over the Indians.

The progressive weakening of the hereditary chief, whose authority was based upon aboriginal activities, was furthered by the decline in warfare. The pacific warfare, although frequently aggressive in character and auxiliary to Mundurucú navigation and expansion, continued the native pattern of authority. The Indians were paid in trade goods. When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the central Amazon region had been pacified, the military help of the Mundurucú was no longer needed. Meanwhile, rubber collecting had become the principal means by which the Indians acquired foreign trade articles. Since the Indians were important to rubber production in labor-starved Amazonia, they were courted to greater efforts by the traders. Increased devotion of the Mundurucú to rubber production correspondingly interfered with their warfare; for in earlier times the rubber season was the time for war. When in 1924 a Franciscan mission was established in their midst, the warlike political and economic basis of Mundurucú warfare was so undermined that the admonitions of the priests that they live in peace were quite effective.

At the end of the second stage of Mundurucú acculturation, only bonds of kinship and economic collectivity in producing food for the group held Mundurucú society together. Much of the old structure was gone. The ritual-ceremonial complex, warfare had ended, and reliance upon the outside economy was taking effect. During the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of Mundurucú who had difficulties with their communities were able to leave their villages permanently. Many others left in order to participate more fully in the rubber economy.

Full dependency upon rubber collection is not compatible with village life. Since the aboriginal Mundurucú villages were located several days' foot travel from the rubber areas (dragging the rivers, a family participating both in collective village life and the rubber economy had to migrate seasonally between the village and its house in the rubber area. Families living in this manner could spend only three to four months in rubber production. The only way the Indians can devote their full efforts to rubber tapping is to leave the villages of the primary environment and live permanently near the rubber trees along the river banks. A large

burned, men and women killed and decapitated, and children stolen.

It has been said that, although individual warriors sought glory, the primary purpose of war was social and only secondarily the gratification of individual egos. The patterns of boasting and vainglory common among North American Indians of the high plains were absent among the Mundurucú. A young man who made great claims of prowess was pushed to the fore during the actual attack as a means of suppressing ego-assertion and not to validate it.

The suppression of individual interests in favor of those of the collectivity of Mundurucú is consistent with the dual ethic and world-view of this war-oriented society. The joy and pride that they obtained from external aggression is matched only by the horror aroused by internal strife. A Mundurucú man never struck another in anger. If dissension arose, the principals temporarily avoided each other rather than show open hostility. Intragroup tensions did exist for a variety of causes, among which rivalry over women and fear of sorcery were predominant. The culture provided few internal cathartic mechanisms for latent aggression, and, in fact, it enjoined social harmony most positively.

The execution of sorcerers was the only situation in which drastic action was taken against another Mundurucú, and the decision to kill the suspected witch had to be taken by the group as a whole. Sorcery and accusations of sorcery were common in all villages, and the subject was so feared that pro-

to stand too far above his fellows. A Munduruc\u00fa never boasted of his achievements, nor would he compare himself to others. In fact, it is most difficult to elicit any sort of comparative evaluation of the moral worth of particular individuals from any Munduruc\u00fa.

The prevailing tone of Munduruc\u00fa values is perpetuated in the modern trade situation, for Munduruc\u00fa do not make commercial transactions among themselves. Trade with whites is expected and sought, but those Munduruc\u00fa who conduct trade with their fellows as employees of the whites and on behalf of them are recognized to operate outside the ethical system and attract considerable antagonism. Thus, the modern economic ethic of the Munduruc\u00fa is colored by the same dualism as existed in their warrior period.

The duality of Munduruc\u00fa ethics is closely associated with the institutional core or nexus of the culture. Hostility towards the outer world goes beyond mere distrust and suspicion; it is a positive assertion and celebration of the integrity and cohesiveness of the society. While acting as an escape-valve for intra-social aggressions, warfare served to produce tensions which, paradoxically, contributed towards maintaining balance in the social structure. Witchcraft may be said to have functioned in much the same way.

Manly virtues were esteemed in Munduruc\u00fa culture, and hunting ability was valued second only to strength in war. Male unity in a hostile world was expressed in the semi-military or-

10:Murphy E-5 (1982-1983) 1956
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ganization of the men's house, which also formed a focus for male social participation. Cooperation in the economy was elaborated far beyond the minimum necessary for effective exploitation of the environment; warfare was pursued beyond the requirements of security and its overt magico-religious purposes.

War and fraternity were ritualistic in nature. The relationship between them was causal in the sense that they were interdependent: intense militarism was made possible by male cohesiveness and male cohesiveness was fostered by warfare. Munduruc society was welded by kinship and the ethic of harmony and cooperation. No commitments were owed to those outside the system; the humanity of others was recognized, but it entailed no duties. To have extended the intense moral obligations between Munduruc to persons outside the system would have effectively vitiated and devitalized it.

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12:Murphy E-5 (1952-1953) 1960
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ably principally undertaken by Munduruc6 who had emigrated to this section. But their rapid engagement in trade and the resultant fragmentation of the native social organization made the migrants ill adapted to warfare, and the burden of mercenary activities shifted to those Munduruc6 who had remained on the upper Tapajós.

Raiding on behalf of the whites continued throughout the nineteenth century. Coudreau described one such expedition in 1895.[*] Three white traders had been killed by hostile Indians on the Madeira River, and a group of merchants approached the Munduruc6 to enlist their aid. The Indians were promised advance payment in manufactured goods, and a war party consisting of sixty men and forty women set forth. They traveled to the upper Secundury River across an area of savannah between that stream and the Tapajós; this route had long been the major means of communication and emigration between the Munduruc6 settlements of the upper Tapajós and those on the Madeira waters. This particular expedition met disaster, however, for the virulent malaria of the Secundury River killed almost all participants.

Their military service for the whites was an important factor in maintaining the stability of Munduruc6 culture. The Indians had already become dependent on Western commodities, and warfare provided a means of obtaining them that did not necessitate direct labor for the whites in an extraction industry. Since the latter occupation is, as shall be seen, destructive of the traditional society, the Munduruc6 were, in effect, granted a reprieve from more complete participation in commerce and its effects. Furthermore, they were encouraged by the white men to destroy other tribes and thus to continue a pattern that was dominant in the culture. Warfare contributed greatly to

[*] Coudreau, 1897, pp. 39-40.

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social cohesion also, because it provided a rallying point for tribal cooperation and a common goal in the pursuit of which factional differences were forgotten. And it afforded an escape valve for aggressions that could not be safely unleashed within the society.

These factors helped to preserve the integrity and autonomy of Munduruca society during a period of stress and encroachment. Their cooperation with the whites set a pattern of friendship and mutual respect. The Indians were valuable to the whites, and the latter did not take any action that would disturb the symbiotic relationship. Similarly, the natives relied on the Brazilians for trade goods, and restricted their military activities (which were not by any means always or even usually at the immediate behest of the whites) to tribes that were not yet pacified. And in no case did they war upon the whites. When the great rubber boom arrived, the Munduruca were gradually and peacefully recruited into the labor force, in contrast to the experience of other tribes, and the ease of the transition is no doubt partly attributable to the ties of economic dependency and friendship which had become established.

Trade and exploitation of natural resources came late to the upper Tapajós because of the impediments to navigation imposed by its many rapids, and also because of the specific commodities available there. The rich Tapajós rubber did not begin to assume great economic importance until well into the second half of the century, while the Madeira waters had abundant resources of guaraná and sarsaparilla, both of which were intensively sought in the early nineteenth century; and agricultural products were traded in the latter area on a large scale at an earlier date, also, because Brazilian markets were not far.

Shortly before the mid-century the Munduruca of the

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pay and trophy heads, persisted on a somewhat reduced scale and was especially successful, as Hartt notes, because of the acquisition of firearms.* The continuance of warfare helped to maintain the cohesion of the tribe and village as social units for the reasons already discussed, and also because it bolstered the positions of the chiefs by activating their roles as war leaders.

The Munduruc who remained in their traditional villages in the savannahs east of the upper Tapajós were not as completely absorbed into the invading Brazilian society as the people who migrated to the river banks to tap rubber. But they, too, sought trade goods, and these, increasingly, were available only through rubber production. The most troublesome tribes of the region were largely pacified, and the demand for Munduruc military service had consequently declined. Also, the Indians were more valuable to the traders in collecting rubber, which by the end of the century was netting the traders fabulous monetary returns. The recruitment of Indians into rubber collecting did not cause the immediate disintegration of their village life. Rubber was collected by them only from June to September, during which period they left their savannah villages to live in temporary shelters at their rubber avenues. This seasonal fractionation of the society had a precedent in the traditional practice of scattering along the streams to hunt and fish during the dry season. As in times past, when rubber collection was finished, the dispersed population reunited in their villages, where the native round of activities persisted throughout the remaining nine months of the year.

The Munduruc territory also shrunk, for traditional-type villages no longer existed on the waters of the Cropory River in 1905 when Coudreau ascended the Ta-

* Hartt, 1885, p. 132.

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SOLIDARITY AND FISSION

THE TRIBE

Membership in the tribe was a social rather than a genetic matter. Children captured in war were fully incorporated into the society and are said to have remained loyal even in wars against the villages where they were born. The unity of the group was symbolized by absolute linguistic and cultural homogeneity, and the identity of its members was manifest in the possession of a clan name and the elaborate facial and body tatooing that until recent years was the hallmark of all Munduruců.

The villages had independent subsistence economies, but for an occasional timbó fishing trip in which two communities might coöperate. But a number of villages usually participated in war expeditions and the major ceremonies. These occasions provided the opportunity for scattered clansmen to reunite and for people of diverse residence to coöperate in valued activity.

Warfare was of special importance in this regard, because it called for a high degree of organization and coöperation. When the initiative was taken by the men of one village to go on the warpath, the chief delegated a member of the *Muchachu ewyn*, a society composed of particularly valiant and learned warriors, to visit other communities and extend invitations to take part in the hostilities. Only a part of the men of any one village accepted the invitations, and the rest remained behind to protect the women, children, and old people and to continue hunting and horticultural activities. Thus, intervillage coöperation allowed the Munduruců to raise sizable war parties without imperiling the economies and defenses of the villages.

The structure of Munduruců tribalism was given within the rules of descent and residence. The dispersal of pa-

/2 cont./

*24 [174] mythological and legendary traditions of the Mundurukú lead us to believe that they were not always a people given to the cultivation of plants. This, however, /applies to/ a remote past, which is no longer verifiable nowadays. In historic times, ever since they came *24 175 [269] into contact with civilized people and came to be known, they have been observed to cultivate gardens and to make manioc flour. It is true that the Mundurukú gained greater fame as warriors, for when- [121] ever the opportunity arose they did not hesitate to attack even cities such as Santarém (1780) and Gurupá (1784). (1)

1. Horton, 1948: 272-273.

As colonial rule was strengthened, however, and warring activities decreased, these Indians seem to have tended increasingly toward a more stable way of life and a more extensive and more diversified agriculture. I believe that available texts must be interpreted in this light. Even though they are not all in agreement, the traveling writers provide glimpses of a development in the cultivation methods of these Indians.

*24 [361] Martius, speaking in a general way of the Tupi tribes of the upper Tapajós, including the Mundurukú, regards them, precisely because of this incipient agriculture, as seminomadic. He says: "They practice a primitive agriculture and, therefore, they are not nomads in the strict sense of the term; their villages, however, do not remain immutably in the same place." (2) Monteiro Baena

2. "Sie treiben einen nothduerftigen Landbau, sind daher im strengeren Sinne keine Nomaden; doch bleiben ihre Niederlassungen nicht unveraenderlich an derselben Stelle." Martius, 1867: 201.

[175] testifies that at first, in the years following the pacification of the Mundurukú, their propensity for agriculture was not very great or very strong. Referring to the "Mundrucús" forcefully brought to and